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COMMENTS
for appointed counsel to submit expense itemizations to the judge
for approval and concurrent order to pay. This gives the lawyer
a degree of freedom to operate depending upon the facts of the
particular case, which is better than having him bound by strictly
interpreted terms as to what is acceptable and what is not. The
method allows the judge to use his discretion in fixing reim-
bursement at a fair rate for the work done so that no one will
be able to collect for clearly unjustified expenditures.
Where there is a public defender system, expenses should be
paid on the basis of an annual budget to assure use of funds in
the cases where they are most needed. A permanent, salaried
investigator might help to reduce the cost of the entire operation.
A further reduction of costs would result if public defenders
and assigned counsel were allowed the free use of the State
Crime Laboratory and the assistance of its personnel. This
should produce a substantial saving. In addition, some form
of discovery device in criminal trials"9 would reduce expendi-
tures for investigators and further diminish the cost of defend-
ing indigents.
All these suggestions can be used in Louisiana to create a
program for the defense of indigents at a reasonable cost to the
state. The hope. of change from present practices seems to lie
wit'h a legislature responsive to public opinion that is sufficiently
educated in the realities of administering criminal justice. A
change is imperative in order to secure a fair system of crim-
inal justice for both. the indigent accused and the attorney se-
lected to aid him in his defense.
Walter G. Strong, Jr.
POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES AND WAIVER OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
Each of the states and the federal government has its own
system of criminal procedure. One of the most important and
most publicized aspects of criminal procedure is that which
39. C1. Louisell, Criminal Di .cgver" Dimmq Roof Qr Appartt? .4Q C ,AL
L. REv. 56 (1961).
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deals with post-conviction remedies. Closely related is the right
of state prisoners to invoke federal jurisdiction to enforce their
rights under the Constitution of the United States. In our fed-
eral system of government, most areas of criminal law and pro-
cedure have properly been within the control of the states. How-
ever, federal constitutional claims arising from a state criminal
conviction may ultimately be decided in a federal forum.
The Bill of Rights established rules governing criminal pro-
ceedings in federal courts.' In a significant development of re-
cent years, the United States Supreme Court has held that many
of the protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights are so essen-
tial to a fair trial that they are applicable to state criminal pro-
ceedings through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.2 By carefully scrutinizing cases that may call for applica-
tion of these safeguards, the United States Supreme Court
affords criminal defendants procedural due process to a degree
never before attained in this country.
As a result of the work of the United States Supreme Court,
stricter standards are imposed on both the federal and the state
courts and more judgments are attacked directly by appropriate
appellate procedure and collaterally by habeas corpus. The ad-
ministration of justice demands fair and orderly procedure and
a sense of definiteness. Attempts to meet these requirements
and, at the same time, to maintain adequately the defendant's
constitutional rights, have caused conflicts not only between
the states and the federal government, but also to some extent
among the members of the United States Supreme Court them-
selves.
"Habeas Corpus is one of the precious heritages of Anglo-
American civilization. We do no more today than confirm
its continuing efficacy."'
"This decision, both in its abrupt break with the past and in
its consequences for the future, is one of the most disquieting
that the Court has rendered in a long time.'" 4
1. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI.
2. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
3. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963), Justice Brennan speaking for
the majority.
4. Id, at 448. Justice Harlan speaking for the dissent.
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Fay v. Noia,5 from which both the preceding quotations'are
taken, is one of the most significant decisions in recent years
concerning the grant of federal relief to a state prisoner. The
United States Supreme Court was faced with what at first ap-
peared a simple problem. Noia and two others had been tried
separately and convicted in a New York court for felony-murder
in the perpetration of a robbery. The principal evidence relied
on by the state in each case was the confession of Noia. After
conviction, it was revealed by the state's own admission that the
confession had been coerced in violation of Noia's rights under
the fourteenth amendment. Noia's confederates appealed in
time and subsequent legal proceedings resulted in their release;
but Noia failed to appeal. His subsequent attempts at post-con-
viction relief afforded by state procedure were denied because
of his failure to appeal.6 Noia then sought relief through federal
habeas corpus.
The right Noia asserted was clear. The state had admitted
the unlawfulness of his confession and had released his con-
federates. The federal district court held that Noia must be
denied relief on his writ because of the provisions of 28 USC
section 2254,1 finding that by failing to appeal his conviction,
Noia had failed to exhaust state remedies." The court of appeals
reversed, one judge dissenting, and ordered that Noia's convic-
tion be set aside and that he be discharged from custody or given
a new trial.9
The United States Supreme Court was confronted with three
basic issues. The first involved the doctrine, theretofore gen-
erally applied, under which a defendant's state procedural de-
fault, there the failure to appeal, was held to constitute an ade-
5. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
6. Noia, unable to employ a motion for reargument as he had not appealed
his conviction, had made an application to the sentencing court in the nature
of coram nobi8. The Kings County Court set aside his conviction. The Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the judgment of conviction.
The New York Court of Appeals, in affirming the Appellate Division, held that
Noia's failure to pursue the usual and accepted appellate procedure to gain a
review of the conviction did not entitle him to utilize coram nobis, even though
the asserted error related to a violation of constitutional rights. People v. Noia,
3 N.Y.2d 596, 170 N.Y.S.2d 799, 148 N.E.2d 139 (1958).
7. "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in cus-
tody pursuant to a judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it ap-
pears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the state "
8. Noia v. Fay, 183 F. Supp. 222 (SD,N,Y, 1960),
9. 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir, 1962),
1966]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
quate and independent ground for barring direct review by the
United States Supreme Court. The Court found that this doc-
trine was only a limitation on appellate review and was a con-
sequence of the Court's obligation to refrain from rendering
advisory opinions or passing upon moot questions, since, regard-
less of the federal issue, the prisoner was detained upon valid
state law grounds.'" The Court reasoned that a different situa-
tion was presented on federal habeas corpus where the federal
court was not reviewing the state court judgment, but was deter-
mining the basic issue whether petitioner's detention was con-
stitutionally valid. In such an inquiry, federal law is the only
relevant substantive law, and as between the state's interest in
vindicating its rules of procedure and the interest in vindicating
federal constitutional rights, the paramount interest is the latter.
The Court concluded that the separate and adequate state ground
doctrine could not serve as a limitation on the habeas corpus
authority of the federal courts under the appropriate statutes. 1
In denying relief, the district court had also relied upon the
federal statute12 which requires a petitioner to exhaust the
remedies available in the courts of the state before seeking fed-
eral relief through habeas corpus. The United States Supreme
Court held that this statute was limited in its application to a
failure to exhaust state remedies still open to the applicant at
the time his petition is filed in federal court. 13 At the time of
Noia's habeas corpus application he had no further state rem-
edies.
A third issue which faced the Supreme Court was that of
waiver. The Supreme Court ruled that waiver of a federal claim
is a federal question and a state court's finding would not auto-
matically bar an independent federal examination. In so holding,
10. See Memphis v. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 634-36 (1875) ; Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L.
'REV. 1315 (191); Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners:
An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. Rnv. 423 (1961).
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1948).
12. Id. § 2254.
13. The Court noted the pertinent provisions as incorporated in the revision
of the Judicial Code in 1948 and further stated: "Plainly, the words of section
2254 favor a construction limited to presently available remedies. The only two
decisions of this Court prior to 1948 in which past exhaustion was strongly
suggested were Ex parte Spencer'. . . a nd Frank v. Mangum . . . . The latter of
course, was substantially overruled in Moore v. Dehipsey . . , the, language of
which does not support a notion of forfeitures. On. the other hand, Mooney v.
Holoban . . . is typical of decisions plainly implying a, rule limited t6 presently
pvqilable remedies." Fay v. Toia, .372 U.S. 391- 4 .3..(I9)
[Vol. XXVI
COMMENTS
the Supreme Court enunciated a federal waiver standard adopted
from the test previously set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst.14 The
Court acknowledged in Noia that the exigencies of federalism
warrant a limitation whereby the federal judge has discretion
to deny relief to one who has intentionally waived or deliberately
by-passed state procedures. The Supreme Court stated, however,
that a decision made by petitioner's counsel without consulting
his client will not be considered an intentional relinquishment
of a right or privilege, but that a waiver depends on the con-
sidered choice of the petitioner. The Supreme Court concluded
that Noia's failure to appeal was not an intelligent waiver of
his constitutional rights.', Finding no other bar to the grant of
federal relief, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
decision granting relief to Noia.
The decision was attacked in strong dissents, principally on
the basis of 28 USC section 2241, which provides that habeas
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or treaties of the United States.
This statute is the basis of the "separate and adequate state
ground" doctrine discussed above. Issue was also taken with
the majority's interpretation of 28 USC section 2254 and the
"exhaustion of state remedies" doctrine. It was pointed out that
Noia was not imprisoned in violation of any federal law, but by
a perfectly valid state law as a result of his procedural default,
and that federal power did not extend on direct review or habeas
corpus to grant relief to a state prisoner whose detention was
based on an adequate state ground. 6 Justice Clark, in his dis-
ent, showed great concern for the effect this decision would have
on the administration of criminal justice in the state courts.
Noting that the Supreme Court's consideration of Noia's ap-
plication came some twenty years after his conviction, Clark
argued that the decision relegated state court judgments to a
"judicial limbo" where they would be subject to federal collateral
attack years later. Justice Clark also predicted that there would
14. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938): "[A]n intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege."
15. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439-40 (1963): "Under no reasonable view
can the state's version of Noia's reason for not appealing support an inference
of deliberate by-passing of the state court system. For Noia to have appealed
in 1942 would have been to run a substantial risk of electrocution. His was the
grisly choice whether to sit content with life imprisonment or to travel the
uncertain avenue of appeal which, if successful, might well have led to a retrial
and death sentence."
16. See note 10 supra.
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be a great influx of new applications from state prisoners, and
because he expected ninety-eight percent to be frivolous, he
foresaw an adverse effect on the few meritorious applications.
17
Henry v. Mississippi8 is another significant decision in this
area. The defendant was convicted in a Mississippi state court
of disturbing the peace. His conviction was based mainly on
the testimony of a police officer regarding evidence obtained
in an illegal search. Mississippi law requires objection to the
admissibility of evidence to be made at the time it is offered,
but defense counsel failed to object to the officer's testimony
until the end of the prosecution's case. There seemed to be some
question whether defense counsel purposely omitted timely ob-
jection to the testimony. 19 The Supreme Court of Mississippi
affirmed the conviction, by applying the "contemporaneous ob-
jection" rule even though it acknowledged that the search had
been in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. 20 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In its decision the Court recognized the general principle that
it will decline to review state court judgments which rest on ade-
quate state grounds, even though those judgments also decide
federal questions. 21 But the Court stated that whether a failure
to comply with state procedural rules can preclude its considera-
tion of the federal question is itself a federal question. In Henry,
the basis of the state decision was procedural: failure to object
contemporaneously to the introduction of evidence. The Supreme
Court held that to preserve such a system of defaults in the
state procedure a strong state interest must be found. The Court
found that the particular rule served an important state interest
and that if the failure to object in time was strategic and de-
liberate it would constitute a waiver of possible constitutional
rights. 22 Since the Court found some evidence of deliberateness,
the case was remanded to the state court to consider the issue
of waiver. It was pointed out that the defendant could still use
17. 372 U.S. 391, 446 (1963), quoting from Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
537 (1953) : "He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up
with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search."
18. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
19. When the prosecutor sought to introduce the testimony in question, one
of petitioner's attorneys stood up as if to object, but the other one pulled him
down by his "coat-tails." No objection was then made.
20. 154 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1963).
21. See note 10 supra.
22. Significantly, the Court cited Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), as au-
t4 )rity for this proposition.
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habeas corpus after state adjudication unless it was clearly
shown that he had deliberately by-passed the state procedure.
The Supreme Court relied heavily on Fay v. Noia. Justice
Brennan asserted that allowing the state court to reconsider
the question would create harmony between the federal and
state systems and would also relieve the federal dockets.2
In his dissent, Justice Black maintained that the issue should
have been decided in the United States Supreme Court. He saw
no evidence of intentional waiver, only an honest mistake by
defense counsel, and argued that the Mississippi rule should not
serve as an adequate state ground in view of the obvious viola-
tion of due process. He concluded that the Mississippi Supreme
Court, by relying on its own decisions, could have ruled for de-
fendant and that remanding would only serve to confuse and
cloud the issue.
Justice Harlan's strong dissent was based on his dissent in
Fay v. Noia.2 4 He asserted that the adequate state ground rule
should prevent Supreme Court review, and that Henry extended
Fay v. Noia from habeas corpus to direct review. He further
argued that the states must maintain the integrity of their pro-
cedure to insure orderly administration of justice. Harlan con-
cluded that the threat of collateral attack through federal habeas
corpus would leave states little choice but to reverse in cases such
as this.
Though there has been no subsequent Supreme Court case
directly in point, the Court on several occasions has approved
Noia. 25 Especially significant was Townsend v. Sain,26 which
virtually assured a full evidentiary hearing for petitioners in
federal habeas corpus proceedings.
From the above cases it seems apparent that the constitu-
tional rights of criminal defendants will not be defeated by the
"separate and adequate state ground" doctrine. This doctrine
will not be applied as a bar to federal relief on direct review
or in habeas corpus. It also seems clear from Noia that habeas
corpus petitioners in the federal courts need exhaust only those
23. The Supreme Court cited the 1964 Annual Report of the Director, Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts, which reflects an 85% increase in
habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners from fiscal 1963 to 1964.
24. 372 U.S. 391, 448 (1963).
25. E.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Smith v. Mississippi, 373 U.S. 238 (1963).
26. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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state remedies available at the time of the petition to qualify
for federal relief. A review of recent decisions in the lower fed-
eral courts shows that where state remedies were available at
the 'time federal relief was sought, the federal, courts have not
hesitated to remand the case to the state courts but without
prejudice to the prisoner's right of invoking federal habeas
corpus after final state adjudication of the matter.27 This result
has been reached even though it appeared that the state court
would deny the relief sought or even fail to consider the case
on the merits. 2s On the other hand, where it was clear that the
prisoner had exhausted his existing state remedies, the lower
federal courts have entertained the case. .This procedure seems
correct because it affords the states an opportunity to adjudicate
the criminal cases within their jurisdiction, and also assures
defendants a fair hearing on their federal claims. There are
rumblings of "anticipatory removal" and of changes in' habeas
corpus which would allow federal claims, especially in civil rights
cases, to be adjudicated in the federal courts without remand to
the states.29 Such proposals would seem to draw support from
Justice Black's dissent in Henry.3
WAIVER
While these procedures seem now fairly well established, the
issue of waiver enunciated in Noia and Henry may cause dif-
ficulties. In Noia the Court recognized the states' legitimate
interest in promoting the proper use of state procedures, but
reasoned that those interests could be adequately protected by
empowering the federal district courts to refuse relief if an
applicant had "deliberately by-passed" state procedure. Evi-
dently this requires "an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege." 31 The federal district judge,
however, is granted a discretionary power which would enable
him to hear federal claims despite a deliberate by-pass. 82 Clearly,
27. See Cyronne-DeVirgin v. Missouri, 341 F.2d 568 (8th 'Cir. 1965) ; Martin
v,. Spradley, 341 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Brown v. North Carolina, 341 F.2d
87 (4th Cir. 1965).28. Pate v. Holman, 343 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Pate,
341 F.2d 885 (7th Cir, 1965).29. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil
Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court
Trial, 113 U. PA.'L. REV. 793 (1965).
30. 379 U.S. 443, 453 (1965).
31. This rule originated' in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) and was
followed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391- (1963),.
32. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
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where a defendant has by-passed state procedure, the facts and
circumstances involved must be carefully scrutinized. in addi-
tion, it is to be remembered from Noia that the defendant is not
necessarily bound by the acts of his attorney. Considering these
limitations on waiver by the defendant, it seems that in situa-
tions other than those involving an intentional strategy it is
quite doubtful whether a finding of waiver by a state court will
be upheld in a federal hearing.
The question of 'waiver has often arisen in the right to coun-
sel area, where the defendant has been convicted without an
attorney38 The defendant's appearance in court with counsel
suggests other serious questions. If counsel fails to raise a per-
tinent issue, whether negligently or strategically, how is Noia to
be applied? Must the attorney consult with the defendant even
-on matters which are strictly technical, such as rules of evi-
dence? Must the, state prove that petitioner was aware that his
constitutional rights were being violated but nevertheless, after
discussion with his attorney, decided to remain silent?
* A review of some of the cases in both the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts will indicate the confusion and lack of
'uniformity in iiterpretation of the federal waiver standard
enunciated in Noia. It is not necessary to look beyond Henry to
begin the inquiry. Henry's attorney failed to object contem-
poraneously to the admission of allegedly unconstitutional evi-
dence, as required by state procedure. After settling several
other issues,34 the Court remanded the case to the state courts
to determine if the failure -to object was a strategic and de-
liberate by-pass of state procedure, indicating that if it was,
the, defendant Would be deemed to have waived his right to ob-
ject. The, Supreme Court noted that such acts of counsel would
bind the defendant as part of the hazards of trial. It is sub-
mitted that the, practical problem of determining what is de-
liberate strategy is almost insurmountable, and, more important,
that this definition of waiver falls short of that set forth in
Noia.
Another problem arises -where the' systematic exclusion of
Negroes from jury service is not raised until the petitioner asks
for post-conviction relief. :Geiierally, states require that objec-
tions to the composition of a jury, venire be raised by pre-trial
33. See Comment, 26 LA. L. REv. -6 86 (1966) .
34. See discussion of Henry, note§ 18-24 and accompanying text 8upra,
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motion and that a petitioner who does not file a timely objection
waives his right to assert it in a post-conviction hearing. Federal
courts have held that this rule will not satisfy Noia even though
counsel was present at the trial 5 Thus, the defendant is in an
enviable position. He is not bound by the acts of his attorney and
can refrain from objecting pending the outcome of the case;
if he loses, he can then assert the alleged violation of his rights.
Waiver by strategic non-assertion of the objection would, it is
submitted, be almost impossible to establish.
In Harvey v. Mississippi,80 an indigent was convicted of a
misdemeanor without the benefit of counsel. The petitioner in-
formally pleaded guilty to a justice of the peace after he had
been advised that the penalty would only involve a fine. Peti-
tioner was advised that he would subsequently be notified of
the actual penalty. Petitioner was notified on his subsequent
arrest that the penalty was a fine and ninety days imprisonment.
The arrest came after the forty-day statutory delay allowed for
taking an appeal and thereby precluded the petitioner from
,exercising this right. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on
,habeas corpus, followed Noia and found that petitioner had ex-
hausted his state remedies and the failure to appeal was no bar
to federal relief on habeas corpus. The court required that only
existing remedies in state courts be exhausted. Petitioner was
granted a federal hearing and relief followed based on the ab-
,sence of counsel at defendant's trial even though petitioner had
been convicted of a misdemeanor.
In Linkletter v. Walker 7 the Supreme Court seemed to di-
gress from the basic theories of Noia. Petitioner was convicted
of burglary by a Louisiana court and his conviction was affirmed
by the highest state court.88 After Mapp v. Ohio,39 in which
the Supreme Court held that evidence illegally seized was in-
admissible in a state criminal trial, petitioner applied for a writ
of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that
the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp does not apply to state
court convictions which had become final before its rendition.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Black asserted that this holding
35. Cobb v. Balkcom, 339 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Whitus v. Balkcom, 333
F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1964).
36. 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
37. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
38. 239.La. 1000, 120 So. 2d 835 (1960).
39. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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was contrary to Noia in that a person held in state prison on
unconstitutional grounds should be afforded relief unless there
was an intentional waiver. Since the exclusionary rule of Mapp
was not in force at the time of trial, neither Linkletter nor his
counsel could have intelligently waived rights created by Mapp.
However, the majority indicated that the primary purpose of
Mapp was enforcement of the fourth amendment through ex-
clusion of illegally obtained evidence and that this purpose would
not be advanced by making the rule retroactive. The decision,
in the final analysis, seems to be based on policy and on that
basis it is probably correct.
A review of cases in the lower federal courts indicates that
the Noia waiver doctrine has been frequently considered. The
courts, on a close analysis of the facts of each case, have decided
the issues sometimes for 40 and sometimes against 41 the petitioner.
EFFECTS ON LOUISIANA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In State v. Davidson4 2 defendant pleaded not guilty at ar-
raignment. On the same day, the court appointed counsel for
him and granted a fifteen-day delay to file pleadings. No special
pleas were filed prior to trial. After testimony by one witness,
the state marked for identification certain incriminating articles
found by police officers in defendant's automobile and defense
counsel moved to suppress. The motion was denied as prema-
ture; the court ruled that defendant must wait until the state
had offered the articles in evidence. The state subsequently
questioned certain witnesses concerning these articles, but
through inadvertence the articles were never offered as evi-
dence. Later, while the state was questioning a police officer
concerning defendant's arrest, defense counsel again moved to
suppress. The court denied the motion on the ground that it
came too late, holding that appellant's failure to file a formal
motion to suppress in advance of trial constituted a waiver of
his right to question the legality of the search and seizure and
to assert that it violated his constitutional rights. Defendant
was convicted and appealed. The Louisiana Supreme Court af-
40. Dillon v. Peters, 341 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1965).
41. Eskridge v. Rhay, 345 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Ball,
344 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1965).
42. 248 La. 161, 177 So. 2d 273 (1965). See State v. Rasheed, 248 La. 309,
178 So. 2d 261 (1965), where the same reslt was rqached,
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firmed. The court recognized the exclusionary rule of Mapp,
but pointed out that the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
enacted prior to Mapp did not provide the necessary vehicle for
excluding such evidence. The court noted that where there was
no state procedure by which evidence could be suppressed a ma-
jority of states have followed the procedure of Federal Rule
41 (e), 43 which provides that the court in its discretion may
entertain the motion at the hearing or the trial. Asserting the
procedural desirability of a pre-trial motion, the court held that
since the exclusionary rule must be applied in all state criminal
cases under Mapp, the procedural rights of the accused should
also conform to the federal standard, and that the states should
not provide any less onerous procedure than would have been
applied in a federal court. It added that in applying the exclu-
sionary rule it is the policy of the Louisiana Supreme Court to
adopt the procedural rule of the court from which the exclu-
sionary requirement emanated. In conclusion, the court held
that "in order for an accused to invoke the exclusionary rule
in this state, it is necessary for him to file a pre-trial motion
either to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence ob-
tained by the prosecution and that failure to do so, in the absence
of a showing of surprise or lack of opportunity to file such a
motion, operates as a waiver of any claimed violations of his
constitutional rights against illegal search and seizure." 44
It is submitted that this falls far short of the federal waiver
standard. Since the proper procedure for a motion to suppress
illegally obtained evidence was not settled in Louisiana prior to
this case, it seems impossible that the defendant or his counsel
could have made an intelligent waiver as prescribed by Noia, or
a strategic waiver as envisioned in Henry. Despite the adoption
by the Louisiana Supreme Court of the pertinent federal rule,
the result does not seem to be in conformity with the federal
rule because it takes no account of the discretion contemplated
by rule 41 (e) , 4 which clearly allows .the motion to be made
43. Fm). R, Civ. P. 41 (e) : "Motion shall 'be made before the trial or hearing
unless the opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware
of the grounds for the motion, but the Court in its discretion may entertain the
motion at the trial or hearing." See Henry v. State, 174 So. 2d 348 (Miss.
1965), which is the Henry case on remand to' the state court from the United
States Supreme 'Court. The Mississippi Supreme Court adopts the federal rule
granting discretion to the court ,to grant the motion at any time, even after
defendant has presented his case.
44. 248 La. 161, 177 So. 2d¢ 73;,275 -(1965).
15. See note 43 supra,...., .
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during trial even in the absence of surprise or lack of oppor-
tunity to file, in the court's discretion. The proposed revision
of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure includes procedure
patterned after the federal rule,46 under which the Louisiana
courts should have little difficulty in satisfying the federal
standards in this area.
Statistics show that a disturbing number of cases which orig-
inated in state courts are being brought before federal courts for
adjudication. This is not merely unfortunate; it is unnecessary.
The states can retain control over the administration of criminal
justice by the adoption of necessary procedures. One of the most
effective measures would be the enforcement of proper state
habeas corpus procedures in accordance with federal standards.
State judicial machinery must be equipped to adjudicate, after
final conviction, all the federal claims which a prisoner might
assert on federal habeas corpus. Obviously, this machinery does
not now exist in many states, including Louisiana.
Violation of due process is not a ground for habeas corpus
relief in Louisiana.47 Therefore, at present, a state prisoner who
seeks post-conviction relief on these broad grounds must depend
upon the federal courts. In the proposed revision of the Louisi-
ana Code of Criminal Procedure denial of due process is listed
as a ground for habeas corpus relief, and if this provision is
adopted, Louisiana courts will then be equipped to hear these
claims.48 Further, the state must permit its convictions to be
collaterally attacked in its own courts on all federal grounds;
otherwise many of the cases will be tried, at least in part, in the
federal courts. Several states have adopted the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act,49 which provides liberal and effective
measures for final settlement of constitutional claims in the state
courts, if the courts can avoid excessive narrowness in their
treatment of waiver.5
0
As it is evident that the power of the federal courts is as
broad as the concept of due process itself, it is important to have
state procedures that will enable defendants to assert their due
46. Proposed Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 703 (1966).
47. LA. R.S. 15:137 (1950).
48. Proposed Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 362(9) (1966).
49. 9B U.L.A. §§ 1-14.
50. See Young v. Warden, 233 Md. 596, 195 A.2d 713 (1963) ; Jordon v.
Maryland, 221 Md. 134, 156 A.2d 453 (1959).
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process claims in the state courts. However, state post-conviction
remedies must be liberally applied if they are to serve as a sub-
stitute for the well-trodden path to the federal courts.
H. D. Salassi, Jr.
